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Abstract: By analysing Swiss common pool resource (CPR) institutions, this
paper aims to contribute to the debate on comanagement while demonstrating
how important it is to take into account the structuring role played by public
policies in the regulation of natural resource use in western european countries
characterized by significant state intervention. The comparative analysis of three
detailed case studies dealing with hunting, flood protection, and landscape
management policies leads to three main conclusions: (1) CPR institutions
strengthen the coherence of natural resource regimes management policies to
the extent that they constitute social institutions which can facilitate the
‘‘mediation process,’’ i.e. the transformation of the collective identity, self-
perception and, therefore, behaviour of policy target groups in the direction
defined by the stated policy objectives; (2) one of the main conditions for the
perpetuation of CPR institutions is their capacity to organize their activities
around a collective problem defined as such by a policy; (3) the integration of
CPR institutions into the political-administrative arrangement contributes to the
reinforcement of the functional and territorial coordination between payers,
decision makers, and beneficiaries in regional and local institutional regimes.
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1. Introduction
The theory of the commons has been enhanced by successive developments
involving the improved allowance for the complexity of real life institutional
arrangements. Starting from relatively simple models based on the study of
common pool resource (CPR) institutions in the purest form, operating under
the most unadulterated conditions possible (Ostrom 1990), interest has grown
in more complex commons, such as global commons (Ostrom et al. 2002;
Berkes 2006) involving multiple spatial, temporal, and institutional levels (Cash
et al. 2006). The institutions regulating such complex resource use situations
have been conceptualized in terms of comanagement (Jentoft 1989; Berkes and
Folke 1998), which deals with problems arising from cross-level interaction.
By analysing Swiss CPR institutions, this paper aims to contribute to the debate
on comanagement while demonstrating how important it is to take into account
the structuring role played by policies in the regulation of natural resource use
in western european countries, which are characterized by both significant state
intervention and the legal codification of most regulations. The approach
presented here combines policy analysis with institutional economics of natural
resources. We adopt Ostrom’s definition of CPR institutions as clearly defined
groups of individuals who, while defining a set of rules regulating their use of
the resource in accordance with local conditions, create a long-enduring local
institutional arrangement capable of monitoring the actions of members vis-a-`
vis the resource, resolving conflicts, and administering sanctions to offenders
(for a detailed discussion of these criteria, see Ostrom 1990, p. 90).
Policy analysts are often victims of the biased view that CPR institutions
are a relic of the past condemned to disappear in the context of today’s policies.
This lack of interest is demonstrated by the dearth of studies on the specific
role played by this kind of institution in the policy process. This is due to a
presumed loss of functionality by such institutions, which, in the opinion of the
analysts who make this presumption, is down to two main reasons. First,
appropriators are often less dependent on the local natural resources; dependency
being a factor that increases the likelihood of the endurance of CPR institutions
(Ostrom 2000; Reynard 2000; Nahrath 2000a). Second, from the 1950s, CPR
institutions began to suffer from competition with the welfare state, whose
policies have shifted resource management responsibilities to higher decisional
levels, resulting in less room to manoeuvre for local property rights holders, in
particular CPR institutions.
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Recent empirical observations focusing on the regulation processes associ-
ated with several natural resources in Switzerland (Knoepfel et al. 2001, 2003;
Knoepfel and Gerber 2008; Nahrath 2000b; Thomi 2005; Varone et al. 2002)
stressed the importance of CPR institutions, which have survived in many cases,
despite the predictions of their inevitable demise. Examples even exist of CPR
institutions that have been revitalized or newly created (Knoepfel and Gerber
2008; Reynard 2000). Thus, it would appear that some CPR institutions have
managed to adapt to the economic, technological, social, political, and institu-
tional changes that have affected western european societies over the past
century.
Based on the various factors outlined above, three questions involving the
implementation of natural resource policies in Switzerland are dealt with below:
(1) What role do CPR institutions play within the implementation process of
natural resource management policies? (2) What are the conditions of the
perpetuation of CPR institutions within western European countries character-
ized by a high density of policy regulations and an exclusive property rights
regime? (3) What are the advantages and disadvantages of political-administra-
tive arrangements involving CPR institutions in the implementation of sustain-
able resource management policies?
This paper begins by describing the institutional, jurisdictional and political
context of the regulation of CPR in Switzerland in brief and conceptual terms.
Second, we quickly present the different steps involved in policy analysis and
show how it can complement the institutional economics approach to CPR
situations. This enables us to formulate three research hypotheses. Following a
concise description of the research procedure, the rest of the paper is devoted
to the detailed presentation of three case studies (part 3) dealing with hunting,
flood protection and landscape management, and to the conclusions drawn
which return to the three research questions posed above.
2. The institutional context of CPR regulation in Switzerland
Two major changes affected the political regulation of CPR in the twentieth
century: the diffusion of the concept of exclusive property rights and the
implementation of a huge number of public policies from the 1950s. The French
Revolution thoroughly altered the property rights regime – i.e. the legal
definition of property – in most European countries. It marked the decline of
the feudal conception of simultaneous and common property (plura dominia)
and the emergence of the conception of exclusive and private property (Ost
2003). The effects of this profound change in continental Europe were
comparable to those provoked by the enclosure movements in England (Polanyi
2001).
This change in the property regime also had profound consequences in
Switzerland. In the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, we observe
the progressive disappearance of the legal definition of ‘‘common’’ or
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‘‘collective’’ property and the ‘‘privatisation’’ of the commons. Thus, the Federal
Swiss Civil Code of 1912 incorporates only a few examples of common or
collective property (i.e. one indivisible object with several owners), the main
ones being inheritance communities and family-run agricultural enterprises.
Moreover, it merely mentions the possible existence of other forms of CPR
institution (i.e. corporations), that is they are merely tolerated by the Civil
Code. The difficult task of redefining their legal status is assigned to the cantons
(federal states). The lack of legal recognition of CPR institutions is accompanied
by a change in people’s attitude towards common property, and both factors
resulted in the general weakening of the long-established local CPR institutions
such as communal pasture and forest tenures and Alpine irrigation communities.
Many of these corporations disappeared in the twentieth century and much of
the common land was sold to private owners or became the property of local
authorities.
The collapse of the regional and local common resource management
regimes and the correlated individualization of use rights to resource units
resulted in a greater heterogeneity of practices which proved difficult to
coordinate at that level of resource systems (e.g. the hydrological cycle, air
shed, landscape, ecosystem, biodiversity, climate, endangered plant and animal
species, etc.). Because it prevents the definition of use quotas at the resource
system level, the uncoordinated attribution of use rights is one of the main
causes of overexploitation. It is precisely this kind of situation that led to the
development of increased state regulation in the form of environmental policies,
in particular from the 1970s onwards. Thus, for three or four decades, the
regulation of each of the various CPRs was the outcome of the combination of
the accumulation of private law-defining property rights (property rights
system), on the one hand, and the accumulation of protection and use policies
(public policies), on the other.
The Swiss political regime is characterized by two central institutional rules
that have a significant impact on the policy implementation process: i.e. the
principle of subsidiarity and the principle of cooperative federalism. Subsidiarity
has two main features: (1) ‘‘public intervention and public help should only
occur in situations where private means would not suffice to achieve goals’’
(Linder 1994, p. 56); and (2) the attribution of policy competencies to the
lowest possible institutional level. Insofar as it consists in ‘‘the completion of
federal legislation by the cantons, the implementation of federal programmes
by cantonal and local authorities, and extensive finance – and revenue –
sharing’’ cooperative federalism concretizes the principle of subsidiarity (Linder
1994, p. 55).
Thus, both subsidiarity and cooperative federalism grant significant room
to manoeuvre the cantons and the municipalities in relation to the definition of
the political-administrative implementation arrangement, the choice of the policy
instruments implemented and even the interpretation of policy objectives and
their prioritization. In this respect, these two political principles undoubtedly
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constitute institutional conditions favourable to the perpetuation and even revival
of (private) CPR institutions, which are frequently invested with implementation
tasks.
3. Theory, hypotheses and methods
3.1. Institutional resource regimes
In order to identify the relevant resource regulation mechanisms, the three
detailed case studies were analysed using the factors provided by the
‘‘institutional resource regimes’’ framework (Knoepfel et al. 2001, 2003, 2007;
Kuks and Bressers 2004; Kissling-Naef and Kuks 2004; Varone et al. 2002).
This framework combines an approach based on policy analysis (e.g. Knoepfel
et al. 2007), on the one hand, and natural-resource institutional economics
(property right theory, e.g. Ostrom 1990; Schlager and Ostrom 1992), on the
other. It postulates that the use of natural resources is best understood through
the analysis of the practical effect of policies on property and use rights.
The policies that constitute one of the two components of an institutional
regime contain all of the substantial and institutional elements relative to the
programming and implementation of the different use and protection policies
affecting the management of a resource (Knoepfel et al. 2007, p. 113ff.): (1) The
(competing or complementary) definition of the different collective problem to
be resolved. The design of environmental policy is often the product of a
historical process involving the accretion of the successive understandings and
definitions of the collective problems to be resolved. (2) The logics of
intervention (causal hypotheses), which change according to the definition of
the problems to be addressed. These logics define the actors (target group)
considered responsible for the existence of the problem and the modes of
intervention (new legal arrangements, pricing) believed capable of producing
the desired changes in the behaviour of the target group(s) (intervention
hypotheses). (3) The policy instruments (regulatory, economic, persuasive, etc.)
implemented in accordance with the different intervention hypotheses. (4) The
political-administrative arrangements (PAA) created in order to implement the
policies. These arrangements usually consist of a configuration of public and
sometimes private actors, characterized by a particular portfolio of resources
(e.g. personnel, money, law, time, etc.). (5) The actual outputs of public
policies. These outputs take the form of individual concreteyspecific implemen-
tation acts in the area of political-administrative legislative programmes (e.g.
planning permission, water pumping concessions, banning of chemical sub-
stances, etc.).
In contrast with policies, the property rights system is composed of all of
the formal property rights, including the rights of disposal and use arising from
them, that apply to a resource. The content of these disposal and use rights
depends on the definition of ownership adopted within a specific political
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entityyterritory (e.g. private, collectiveycommunal, etc.) and applicable to a
particular resource. An analysis of the property rights regime is equally
applicable to the entire resource system and the individual units that provide
the various goods and services. While policies may change rapidly, property
rights are, by nature, stable over time because their modification involves
extensive costs for the state (i.e. compensation costs).
This combination of policies and property rights can be referred to as an
institutional resource regime (IRR). An IRR can be characterized using the
concept of coherence (Knoepfel et al. 2001; Varone et al. 2002). Coherence
can refer to the degree of coordination between policies (in particular between
use and protection policies), between competing propertyyuse rights (internal
coherence), or between the property rights system and public policies (external
coherence). The coherence of a given regime depends in particular on the latter,
i.e. the correspondence between the policy target groups and the holders of
rights to the basis of the property rights system. This correspondence is lacking
when policies address target groups that do not have use rights and whose
eventual changes in behaviour do not have any real effect on the actual use of
the resource (e.g. minimum flow rehabilitation orders aimed at local executives
that no longer hold property titles to water because they have conceded them
to electricity generating companies). Other such incoherencies consist in the
relatively common case whereby policies simply do not have sufficient coercive
power to actually restrict the use rights of the resource users. The capacity of
land owners to resist the implementation of zoning in the context of land-use
planning is a quite recurrent example of this. Empirical research shows that the
volume of case law produced by the courts in order to connect the two
components of the regime is a good indicator of the external incoherence of an
IRR. Like court decisions, informal local arrangements or CPR institutions may
re-establish coherence within increasingly complex institutional resource
regimes. Incoherent policies and property rights normally produce use regula-
tions that are incompatible with each other and thus lead to the overuse of
resources.
3.2. Hypotheses
Three hypotheses corresponding to the three research questions are tested:
3.2.1. H1: Mediation process
Inasmuch as they constitute social institutions that are able to facilitate the
‘‘mediation process’’ (Jobert and Muller 1987), the transformation of the
collective identity, self-perception and, therefore, behaviour of policy target
groups in the direction defined by the stated policy objectives, CPR institutions
strengthen the coherence of institutional regimes. Thus, CPR institutions smooth
the process of the transformation of propertyyuse rights holders into cooperative
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policy target groups. In this context, CPR institutions assume a function
involving the translation or embedding of the policy objectives and instruments
into the logic of the existing property rights system.
3.2.2. H2: Integration in the political-administrative arrangement (PAA)
One of the main conditions of perpetuation of CPR institutions is their enduring
integration into the PAA of one or more public policies regulating the use of
the resource. This integration itself depends on the existence of a convergence
between the policy objectives and the objectives adopted by the CPR institution
(i.e. its raison d’etre).ˆ
3.2.3. H3: Coordination between payers, decision makers, and beneficiaries
The integration of CPR institutions into the political-administrative arrangement
contributes to the reinforcement of the functional and territorial coordination
between payers, decision-makers, and beneficiaries in regional and local
institutional regimes. Indeed, in a CPR institution, holders of property and use
rights (i.e. the policy beneficiaries) usually pay significantly more for the
maintenance of the resource than other tax payers; however, in return, they also
benefit from greater decision-making powers regarding the management of the
resource system and the possibility of making direct use of the different resource
units.
3.3. Methods
The following examples of CPR institutions were analysed in the case studies:
a specific hunting management system in northeast Switzerland, ‘‘dyke
corporations’’ formed by land owners, and self-organized landscape management
structures. Both the legal framework, within which the CPR institutions operate,
and the internal functioning of the latter are examined in all cases. This enables
us to describe the role played by these institutions in the policy implementation
process using the different elements relating to their programming and imple-
mentation presented above. The presentation of each case study ends with a
brief discussion of the hypotheses.
It is not the aim of this article to present an exhaustive analysis of the role
of CPR institutions in all natural resource management policies in Switzerland.
Instead, with the help of the qualitative comparison of a few case studies, it
aims to identify the mechanisms of causal relations between the two phenomena
of the contemporary functioning of CPR institutions, on the one hand, and the
implementation of natural resource management policies, on the other. Based
on our empirical knowledge of resource management policies in Switzerland, it
is possible to state that the three examples presented are typical of the situation
in Switzerland.
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4. Case study 1: hunting associations in north-east Switzerland
4.1. Hunting regulations in Switzerland
Since the fifteenth or sixteenth century, wildlife has been a CPR regulated by
a state-property regime in Switzerland. It constitutes part of a state’s regalia.1
The organization of hunting thus became a matter of the legal competence of
the cantons that constituted the old Swiss Confederacy. Throughout this period
until the nineteenth century, the cantons regulated and organized hunting
practices in a highly varied and uncoordinated way. During the second part of
the nineteenth century, the dramatic decrease in wildlife population (definition
of the problem), a direct consequence of this uncoordinated regulation of
hunting practices, led to strong intervention by the new federal state (the Swiss
Confederation).
According to the Swiss Federal Constitution of 1874, the Confederation is
entitled to legislate on the regulation of hunting and the protection of a number
of endangered species and large game animals in the Alpine regions. Thus, the
primary causal hypothesis of hunting policy is founded on the idea that if the
aim is to reverse the dramatic decrease in the game and wildlife populations
and guarantee the long-term existence of healthy wildlife stocks and biodiversity,
the hunting plan (i.e. the quantity of game that hunters (associations) can kill
during a specific period) must be rendered proportional to the reproduction
capacity of the wildlife resource. It is interesting to note here that whereas,
historically, the implementation of this causal hypothesis involved the significant
restriction of the number of game animals killed per hunter (or group),
nowadays, it sometimes involves the opposite, i.e. the shooting of a minimum
quota of game animals to avoid phenomena associated with local over-
population.
However, it is important to note that the property rights to game (i.e.
hunting regalia) remain the privilege of the cantons and not of the Confederation.
This monopoly is fiscal in nature. Thus, the cantons alone are entitled to collect
fees resulting from the sale of hunting rights (Petitpierre-Sauvain 1999;
Zimmerli 1951). As we can see, contrary to the situation in a number of other
European states such as France, Germany, Austria, Belgium and the Netherlands,
in Switzerland there is no direct relation between landed property and hunting
rights. As in the United States (Buck 1999), game or wildlife is not the property
of the landowner (or of the state) and remains a res nullius as long as it is
alive.
In this resource regime, the Confederation is responsible (intervention
hypothesis and instruments) for determining what can be hunted (definition of
The formal (legal) situation concerning property rights is, however, somewhat more complex.1
Wildlife and game do not belong to anybody (res nullius), but the state has a ‘‘regalian’’ right
over the appropriation of the resource (state’s regalia) and is, therefore, exclusively entitled to
collect fees resulting from the exercise of this right. However, once shot, game animals belong to
the hunter who killed them.
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the protected species), when (definition of the shooting season), where (defi-
nition of the hunting regions and of the preserve hunting reserves) and how
(definition of permitted hunting methods, types of weapons, and munitions).
The Confederation also defines the relevant sanctions. The cantons are respon-
sible for defining who is entitled to hunt (organization of the hunting permit
examinations), how much game can be shot (wild-life monitoring and devel-
opment of the (annual) hunting plan) and for the selection of the hunting
system (licence, rental, or state regulation). The cantons are also free to organize
monitoring of compliance with the regulations by game-keepers.
During the first half of the twentieth century, this division of responsibilities
(general political-administrative arrangement) between the cantons and the
Confederation led to the progressive development of three fundamentally
different hunting systems (i.e. policy designs) based on very different interven-
tion hypothesis and cantonal political-administrative arrangements:
1. The state regulation system in the canton of Geneva is characterized by the
fact that hunting is completely prohibited and that the environmental
administration has been assigned the task of monitoring and regulating
wildlife and its habitats.
2. The licence-based system exists in 16 cantons of central and western
Switzerland. The basic principle of this system consists in the possibility
for any hunters who have passed the relevant examination to hunt a certain
quota of game animals (defined by an administrative and political decision)
on most of the canton’s territory (with the exception of the federal hunting
reserve) during precisely defined periods of the year. In the late nineteenth
century and the first half of the twentieth century, the licence system was
considered as giving rise to greater ‘‘game consumption’’ (overexploitation)
than the rental one. As opposed to this, recent research has shown that,
nowadays, this system gives rise to instances of local overpopulation due
to the greater (political) difficulty in adapting the definition of hunting
quotas (hunters’ ‘‘path dependency’’) and the number of hunters to the
evolution of wildlife populations (Nahrath 2000b).
3. The rental-based system exists in nine cantons in the northeast part of the
country. The rental system is based on a significantly different principle
than the licence-based one. The former consists in the idea that the basic
unit of a hunting system is not the individual hunter, but the local hunting
association (CPR institution). The hunting association is accountable to the
canton and the municipality for the implementation of the hunting and the
wildlife regulation policy within the hunting territory it rents. More specif-
ically, the association is responsible for monitoring the resources (statistics,
qualitative state), the (self) monitoring of the hunters (behaviour, type of
weapons used, compliance with quotas, distribution and accomplishment of
shared tasks) and the territorial protection of wildlife. Finally, the hunting
association must bear half of the cost of the damage caused by fauna to
agriculture and forestry.
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4.2. Local hunting associations as characteristic of the rental-based system
The rental contract between the canton, the municipality (or municipalities)
and the hunting association is based on a duration of six to eight years. At the
end of this period, the contracts are reassigned by the municipality, usually
through an auction system. Admission or exclusion is subject to the approval
of all members of the hunting association. As the number of territories available
for rent is limited, the number of local associations and, consequently, hunters
is also limited, contrary to situation that prevails under the licence system.
This delegation of responsibility has some advantages for the members of
the association: They have the fundamental right to accept or exclude non-
members from access to the resource, the hunting periods are significantly
longer than those that apply under the licence system, cantonal control of the
club members’ behaviour is not tight, and the clubs enjoy considerable freedom
in relation to the organization of hunting activities within the rented territory
(for example the possibility of creating teams or groups and of defining the
way in which the quotas are reallocated). A consequence of these shared
responsibilities is that the members of such associations are strongly incentivized
to collaborate in the good management of both the rented territory and the
resource.
As we have seen, however, although the rental system is characterized by
a strong component of self-organization and self-monitoring, the state has still
prerogatives concerning the management of the resource. In fact, the cantonal
administration defines both the planning objectives and the quotas assigned to
the different rented territories through consultation processes within a hunting
commission composed of representatives of the various actors involved, who2
develop the hunting plans jointly.
In fact, this co-managed system (Berkes 2006; Cash et al. 2006; Young
2006) also shares some of the characteristics of a nested enterprise (Ostrom
1990, p. 90), except for the fact that, in this case, the canton remains the central
actor of the governance structure. Thus, within this system, appropriation,
provision, monitoring, enforcement, conflict resolution, and governance activi-
ties occur at different organizational levels. Moreover, the local hunting
associations are grouped in a peak association organized at canton level. This
association is responsible for both the supply of game and the hunting statistics.
Both sets of data are created by collating information provided by the different
local hunting associations and the official game-keepers (where they exist).
The association also defends the interests of the local associations vis-a-vis the`
cantonal authorities and other interest groups of rival users (e.g. farmers,
tourists, members of nature conservation organizations, hikers, cyclists, etc.).
The commission encompasses representatives of the local hunters’ associations, foresters, repre-2
sentatives from the agricultural sector, the municipalities, and the nature conservation associations.
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Figure 1: Relation between total live-stock numbers and the bag under the rental system (red-
deer wAx and roe wBx) and the licence system (red-deer wCx and roe wDx). The arrow in graph
A indicates a temporary change in the counting method used.
4.3. Compared outputs and outcomes of the licence-based and
rental-based systems
A (very simple) statistical analysis of the available national hunting and wildlife
data over a period of 30 years (1968–1998) reveals some interesting tendencies
in relation to hunting management practices under the different systems and
their effects on the fauna (Nahrath 2000b). For example, a comparison of the
relation between the total number of live-stock and the total number of game
animals shot over a period of 30 years for different species (red-deer and roe)
tends to demonstrate a closer relation between variations in the total live-stock
numbers and the bag in the rental system than in the licence system (Figure
1).
Thus, this statistical analysis of hunting data shows that in the rental system,
management is more sensitive to changes occurring at (micro) local level and
tends to adapt to them more accurately and rapidly. This remains true even if
this adaptation is the result of the sum of different local, independent and
loosely coordinated processes. It would appear that processes of adaptation
between livestock evolution and the definition of hunting plans are easier to
implement in a rental system than a licence-based one. This is probably due to
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the fact that the decision-making process is more directly linked to the local
empirical situation – hunting quotas are co-defined by the hunters and are thus
more easily understood and accepted by them. In fact, whereas in the licence-
based system, the modification of the annual hunting plan affects all of a
canton’s hunters simultaneously and in the same way, modifications in the rental
system have highly segmented territorially differentiated impacts. Thus, signif-
icant modifications are much more easily implemented in the latter system due
to the fact that: (1) hunters are more familiar with such changes; (2) the
changes are not the same for all the appropriators at the same time, and are
less susceptible to leading to collective opposition; and (3) as the consequences
of the changes for the hunters are more fragmented and more directly linked to
local conditions, they tend to be more easily understood and accepted. Comple-
mentary qualitative analysis (interviews, hunting journals) has confirmed these
interpretations (Nahrath 2000a,b).
A second clear advantage of the rental-based system concerns its efficiency.
Comparison has shown that it produces better outcomes in term of fauna
management (Figure 1) at a significantly lower cost for the state. For example,
the ratio between game keepers and hunters is over ten times greater in the
license-based system than in the renting-based ones (Nahrath 2000a, p. 141).3
The case of Swiss hunting policy constitutes a good example of the role
that CPR institutions can play in the implementation of contemporary natural
resource management policies. More precisely, it highlights their potential to
mobilize the existing property rights of the hunting associations in order to
reinforce the hunting policy implementation process. The comparison of some
of the outcomes produced by the different hunting systems tends to confirm the
high level of efficiency of arrangements based on CPR institutions. Finally, the
adaptability of CPR institutions to major policy change confirms their high
level of potential with regard to the implementation of state-steered public
policies. These conclusions are discussed in more detail in the next section.
4.4. Discussion of the hypotheses
4.4.1. H1: Mediation process
This hypothesis is widely confirmed. The integration of the hunting associations
in the cantonal political-administrative arrangement of the rental-based system
has clearly improved its implementation capacities. It has clearly facilitated the
transformation of reluctant (individual) use rights holders (the hunters) into
cooperative target groups. This example shows that CPR institutions can play
the role of an intermediary institution which is able to articulate restrictive
Licence-based system: one game keeper for 120 hunters. Rental-based system: one game keeper3
for 1326 hunters. Moreover, six of the nine cantons that have implemented a rental-based system
do not have any permanent game keeper.
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policy outputs and the individual interests of the target group members. More
precisely, the contribution of hunting associations to the strengthening of the
coherence of the resource regime consists in their capacity to provide a social
engineering structure that enables the self-organized and negotiated process of
rights redistribution. The latter is facilitated by the re-invention of a de facto
common property resource regime within the CPR institution and by its capacity
to provide a shared conception of the collective interest of the members.
4.4.2. H2: Integration in the political-administrative arrangement (PAA)
This second hypothesis is also largely confirmed. The comparison between
licence-based and rental-based cantons clearly shows that the survival of CPR
institutions depends on their integration and empowerment within the (decisional
and) implementation process of one or more policies. Although they also exist
there, the hunting associations in the licence-based cantons play nothing akin
to the same role as that played by the CPR institutions in the rental-based
cantons. Hunting associations in the licence-based cantons tend to behave like
hunters lobbies and have developed far more limited interests, conceptions, and
competencies regarding the role of hunters in the sustainable management of
wildlife and its ecosystems. There is no doubt that the convergence that exists
between the values and interests of the CPR institutions, on the one hand, and
the hunting and wildlife management policy objectives, on the other, constitutes
an important condition for the integration of the hunting associations into the
latters’ political-administrative arrangement. It is also possible to go one step
further here. Historical research (Zimmerli 1951) shows that the presence of
well organized CPR institutions constituted an important explanatory factor for
the choice of rental-based system in certain cantons.
4.4.3. H3: Coordination between payers, decision makers and beneficiaries
Like the other two, this third hypothesis is also fully confirmed. The implemen-
tation of hunting and wildlife management policy by the hunting associations
in the rental-based system leads to a relative convergence of the payer, decision-
maker and beneficiary groups within the resource system. In fact, the hunters
(i.e. the members of the CPR) simultaneously pay for, decide on, and benefit
from the jointly managed resource. Such a convergence clearly contributes to
the reinforcement of the functional and territorial management of the resource
by establishing coordinated use-rights allocation mechanisms between the main
users within the different regional perimeters. Of course, healthy wildlife
populations also benefit a large number of other actors or social groups, such
as forest owners, foresters, nature conservation associations, (mainly) urban
walkers, wildlife observersylovers, etc. However, to some extent, these groups
also contribute financially to (through taxation), and decide on (through hunting
commission), the management of the resource.
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5. Case study 2: the dyke corporations in the canton of Berne
Dyke corporations are an example of CPR institutions that unite local noninsti-
tutional actors, mainly the owners of land and buildings, to take action against
hydrological risks. The service to the community provided by this kind of CPR
institution is protection against potential future flood events.
Dyke corporations still exist today in some of the Alpine areas of
Switzerland. This case study concentrates on dyke corporations in the Alpine
area of the canton of Berne (west-central Switzerland) where dyke corporations
exist in numerous municipalities.
5.1. Swiss flood protection policy
Flood protection is hugely important in Switzerland. Since 1990, floods have
caused damage exceeding EUR 4 billion (PLANAT 2004; FOWG 2005). Each
year, around EUR 500 million is invested in flood protection measures (PLAN-
AT 2005). Although the Federal Law of 1991 on Hydraulic Engineering
attributes the responsibility for flood protection to the cantons, it is the federal
authorities that develop the concepts, strategies and priorities of the measures
to be taken. The implicit causal hypothesis, on which Swiss flood protection
policy is based, refrains from attributing responsibility to specific actors for the
potentially inadequate flood protection provided, i.e. the policy does not
explicitly identify a target group.
Based on the observation that natural hazard processes are the originators
of flood damage (problem definition), flood protection policy proposes two
families of measures. The first causal hypothesis assumes that knowledge of
water courses must be improved to enable the adequate protection of human
life and material assets against floods. The second considers structural flood
protection measures and spatial planning as appropriate measures for reducing
the risk of flooding. Whereas federal flood protection policy assigns the task of
collecting information about flood risks to the federal state, the cantons – and
in some regions also the municipalities – are given the responsibility for
implementing flood-protection policy, in particular for defining the modalities
of the implementation of appropriate flood-protection measures (political-
administrative arrangement).
Although the flood protection policy does not define specific target groups
sensu stricto, these are defined in the cantonal laws on hydraulic engineering.
However, the causal hypothesis remains the same. Thus, target groups are
committed to the coordination, financing, and implementation of flood protection
measures, even though they are not regarded as being responsible for the
protection deficit. Since every canton has its own law on hydraulic engineering,
a large number of public and private actors may potentially belong to the target
group (Thomi 2005; Zaugg 2002). The actors mainly involved are the canton
itself, the municipalities, the concession holders, the hydraulic engineering
associations, the dyke corporations, and the owners of land bordering river
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banks (Zaugg 2002). The beneficiary groups consist of every natural and legal
person who could be affected directly or indirectly by a potential flood.
5.2. The dyke corporations
According to the Bernese Cantonal Law on River Maintenance and Hydraulic
Engineering of 1989, the hydraulic engineering management of rivers is
incumbent on the municipalities. This duty may either be assumed by the
municipality itself or be delegated to an association of municipalities (compris-
ing several municipalities or dyke corporations) or a dyke corporation. The
cantonal legislation grants the corporation the right to levy financial contribu-
tions. However, hydraulic engineering tasks can only be delegated to a
corporation with its agreement. The tasks assigned to the latter are defined in a
regulation act and may encompass the planning, implementation, and financing
of hydraulic engineering projects and of river maintenance measures on specific
or all rivers within the territory of the municipality (intervention hypothesis)
(Kunz and Walther 1989).
The organization and operational mode of each dyke corporation is defined
in its statutes. In most cases, the perimeter of the corporation coincides with
the territory of the municipality. Everyone who owns land or buildings within
the corporation’s perimeter automatically becomes a member of the corporation.
Holders of right of passage (i.e. for cables, pipes, roads, and railway-lines)
may also be considered as members. Each member of the dyke corporation
must pay an annual contribution for flood protection measures (intervention
hypothesis). The contribution is calculated on the basis of the value of the
member’s land and buildings.
Dyke corporations are often characterized by the enthusiasm and motivation
of their president and other members of the executive committee. Corporations
profit from their in-depth knowledge of local water bodies and their long-
standing experience in the area of hydraulic engineering. However, apart from
the committee, the majority of corporation members often show little interest
in active participation, for example in the membership assembly (Thomi 2005).
Despite the important role they play in flood-protection policy implemen-
tation, dyke corporations played only a marginal role in the development of the
new cantonal law on hydraulic engineering which entered into force in 1989.
Indeed, with the allocation of the responsibility for the implementation of river
engineering projects to the municipalities instead of the landowners, dyke
corporations relinquished their very raison d’etre. However, having proven anˆ
appropriate institution for the implementation of the necessary hydraulic
engineering measures, the system of dyke corporations was not abandoned and
was integrated into the new law. Despite various modifications at the organi-
zational level (in general, responsibility was extended from a specific river to
all rivers of the municipality), numerous dyke corporations have survived.
The coexistence of two different systems at the local level – i.e. the
implementation of the federal legislation on flood protection with and without
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a dyke corporation – enables the comparison of the performance of the
institutions involved. One of the most important advantages of corporations is
their financial independence. Dyke corporations can levy annual contributions
on landed property, buildings, and right of passage regardless of the fact that
the owner is a permanent resident. This may be of particular interest in tourist
regions, where second residences are widespread. Since the financial resources
of the municipalities are limited, various causes compete for spending; hydraulic
engineering and river maintenance projects are just one task among many
others. In contrast, not only is a dyke corporation’s budget independent of the
municipality’s budget, its allocation is strictly limited to river maintenance
projects.
Dyke corporations also have some disadvantages vis-a-vis the municipalities,`
mainly in relation to administrative issues and implementation of modern flood-
protection policies. The protagonists of dyke corporations are often unfamiliar
with administrative procedures. Since hydraulic engineering projects involve
formal approval procedures, they could infringe on the corporation’s autonomy
(Thomi 2005). Moreover, modern flood protection policy gives priority to
spatial planning measures (ARE, OFEG, and OFEFP 2005), which are the
responsibility of the municipalities.
Irrespective of whether a dyke corporation or the municipality is responsible
for the implementation of flood protection policy at local level, the beneficiary
group remains the same. Thus, access to flood protection is open to every
natural and legal person affected by a potential flood. However, only some of
the beneficiaries have the right and obligation to belong to the group of decision
makers and payers. In the case of a dyke corporation, all land owners within
its perimeter must pay the contribution. Being a member of the corporation
they also have the option of being involved in decision-making relating to
hydraulic engineering projects and to vote for the executive committee. The
situation is different when the municipality is in charge of hydraulic engineering
projects. In this case, each inhabitant of the municipality contributes indirectly
to the cost through their local taxes. At the same time, citizens may exert an
influence by using their political rights. However, in this situation land owners
whose primary residence is outside the municipality benefit from the flood
protection measures, but do not pay local taxes.
5.3. Discussion of the hypotheses
5.3.1. H1: Mediation process
The implementation of hydraulic engineering projects – and flood protection in
general – today is more than a technical task. It is a process of social and
political negotiation aimed at finding an acceptable solution in terms of safety,
cost, and the design of the measures adopted. In terms of the different actor
groups involved, it is particularly important – but also difficult – to integrate
noninstitutional actors like landowners. A dyke corporation can make the link
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between the public authorities and local people. The interests, knowledge, and
expectations of local people may be reformulated by the corporation and then
defended in front of public authorities. Conversely, the latter can also negotiate
with local people via the corporation. As they often have more experience in
working with institutional actors than noninstitutional ones, this could facilitate
the negotiation process. This hypothesis is thus largely validated.
5.3.2. H2: Integration into the political-administrative arrangement (PAA)
Predecessors of the current dyke corporations existed long before the first policy
on flood protection came into force in the nineteenth century. Dyke corporations
have been integrated into the implementation of federal policy on flood
protection at the cantonal level since the outset. They have always been an
explicit part of the political-administrative arrangement. Thus, the objectives of
dyke corporations are very similar to those of flood-protection policies. This
early integration of the dyke corporations into the PAA of the successive flood-
protection policies certainly goes a long way in explaining the survival of these
institutions in regulatory contexts dominated by state intervention. This hypo-
thesis is entirely validated.
5.3.3. H3: Coordination between payers, decision makers and beneficiaries
The payer, decision-maker, and beneficiary groups are for the most part
congruent in a dyke corporation. Indeed, people who own land or buildings
within the perimeter of the corporation can participate in the decision-making
on hydraulic engineering measures, contribute to their financing, and ultimately
benefit from the flood protection they provide. Unlike the situation with a
municipality, it does not matter whether these people have their permanent
residence within the corporation perimeter or not. The crucial point is that they
have a formal property right to real estate within its borders. The third hypothesis
is also validated.
6. Case study 3: Alpine landscape management organizations
The European Landscape Convention defines landscape as ‘‘an area, as per-
ceived by people, whose character is the result of the action and interaction of
natural andyor human factors’’ (Council of Europe 2000). This definition of
landscape as a cultural and immaterial resource makes a clear distinction
between the landscape and its material basis which is composed of a spatial
combination of elements of the environment (such as natural elements, build-
ings, etc.) (Knoepfel and Gerber 2008). Unlike the other resources that have
been analysed above, the landscape is not regulated by formal property rights.
However, like any other resource, appropriation strategies can be identified in
the case of landscape that constitutes a basis for use rights. The appropriation
of landscape takes place indirectly through property rights to other resources
(in particular the soil), through intellectual property, which allows the associa-
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tion of the representation of a particular landscape with a specific commercial
product, or through policies that create indirect use rights (e.g. access rights).
6.1. Swiss landscape conservation policy
The protection of the landscape in Switzerland is regulated by the Federal Law
on the Conservation of Nature and Landscapes of 1966 which assigns the
responsibility for the conservation of the characteristics of traditional landscapes
to the federal authorities. The law relies on two main causal hypotheses: the
federal state threatens landscapes in the implementation of its tasks (in particular
through building activities, the granting of licences and concessions, and
allocation of subsidies). Thus it must take better consideration of the landscape
in the implementation of such tasks. Without going into further detail, the
federal law also mentions that human activities in general represent a threat to
the quality of landscapes. This paves the way for the financial compensation of
those actors who take action to protect the landscape.
Building on the causal hypotheses, the intervention hypotheses rely on the
introduction of federal inventories, which define objects of national importance
(leading to land-use planning and building restrictions) on the one hand, and
on the support of the federal state in terms of financial subsidies for landscape
conservation and the better representation of landscape interests through the
creation of mainly consultative ad hoc federal commissions, on the other.
The implicit target group defined by the law is as vague as human activity
(building activities in particular) is held responsible for the loss of landscape
quality. The law mainly concentrates on the role played by the federal state
itself. The beneficiary groups are the population, in general, and landscape
protection organizations, in particular.
6.2. Landscape CPR institutions
A transitory phase in landscape protection policies could be observed in the
1990s. While existing instruments, such as inventories, proved insufficient to
curb the degradation of landscapes (OPCA 2005), the concept of the sustainable
use of the entire national territory (including inhabited areas) gained wider
acceptance. In this context, a new instrument has been introduced in the Swiss
legislation in 2006 – regional nature parks – which binds local communities
willing to coordinate their actions in terms of landscapeyenvironmental conser-
vation and economic promotion (tourism).
However, several initiatives comparable to regional nature parks had already
been initiated locally without the unifying legislation at the federal level. These
initiatives correspond to the creation and implementation of landscape manage-
ment organizations on a given territory, which ceases to be a mere area and
becomes an institutional territory that enjoys specific responsibilities at an
intermediary level between communal authorities and cantons.
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In this case study, we concentrated on two particular examples, i.e. the
Baltschieder Valley Commission and the Jungfrau–Aletsch–Bietschhorn World
Heritage Site Society (WHS-Society), which can be considered as the precursors
of the regional nature parks. Both share many similarities with CPR institutions
dedicated to the management of the resource landscape. The Baltschieder-
Commission brings together the mayors of four local administrative communities
along with representatives of nature protection organizations and the canton.
The area managed by the Commission since 1986 totals 42.7 km . The2
Baltschieder valley has also been part of the larger Jungfrau–Aletsch–Biet-
schhorn WHS which covers an area of 824 km since 2001. The WHS straddles2
the border of the two Swiss cantons of Berne and Valais and includes parts of
the territories of 26 municipal authorities, which have representatives in the
bodies of the WHS Society (delegate assembly and executive committee)
together with representatives of the tourism industry, agricultural sector, cable-
car operators, and nature protection organizations. The WHS Society is willing
to encourage the participation of the local population through the organization
of discussion forums for the definition of the priorities to be adopted in the
future (Wiesmann, Liechti, and Rist 2005). It remains open, however, whether
such forums will be continued now that the management plan has been delivered.
The landscape managed by the Baltschieder Valley Commission and the WHS
Society is not permanently inhabited. It mainly comprises unproductive Alpine
land and some mountain pastures; however it is under too much pressure from
visitor flows.
In the high Alpine valleys, nature conservation interest frequently opposes
those of tourism promotion and vice versa; different actors characterized by
different perceptions are responsible for these domains (e.g. private nature
conservation organization versus tourist offices supported by local authorities),
which results in contradictory measures. Advertising attracts visitor flows which
are difficult to manage on the local scale. In short, a balance between economic
and conservation interests is particularly difficult to achieve. Moreover, the fact
that all human activities with a spatial impact also affect landscapes making
this resource particularly difficult to manage.
Given that the Baltschieder Valley Commission and the WHS Society bring
(local) administrative authorities together with representatives of landscape
users (tourism, nature conservation, farming), but no individual users, they do
not entirely meet the definition of an enduring CPR institution. However, they
do unite actors who are willing to improve the management of the resource
landscape so as to promote its image towards external users (tourism) while
also guaranteeing its conservation sustainable use. These landscape CPR
institutions are responsible for their specific organization, as well as for the
tasks being carried out. Moreover, the preservation of the resource landscape is
of vital importance for the participants, because tourism is very often the main
source of income in peripheral regions.
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6.3. Discussion of the hypotheses
6.3.1. H1: Mediation process
The mere existence of structures such as the Baltschieder Valley Commission
and the WHS Society demonstrates that actors who were fundamentally opposed
to each other in the past have become increasingly aware of their rival positions
to the extent that they agreed to come together in one and the same structure.
The long process of the establishment and ‘‘fine-tuning’’ of such landscape
CPR institutions enabled mentalities to change. Despite the difficulty that arises
in evaluating their results due to their relatively short period of existence, it
may be observed that these structures have attained some legitimacy which
only arises because they unite opposing actors, they improve the coordination
of the involved actors, and they enable the identification of universally beneficial
development strategies, i.e. because they contribute to the transformation of the
collective identity of a group who accept that they must accommodate the
claims of others. They allow landscape issues to be better integrated in
development projects, which is a condition for its better management.
The strength of CPR landscape institutions lies in the mediation process
they can engage on a larger scale among heterogeneous groups of actors, thus,
theoretically, their capacity for establishing more coherent regulation. However,
in the current situation, the advantage of a more extensive regulation capacity
has been overshadowed by their lack of power to impose stricter regulations.
This hypothesis is only partly validated.
6.3.2. H2: Integration in the political-administrative arrangement (PAA)
The federal legal basis for the institution of CPR landscape institutions (regional
nature parks) arrived after the creation of different pilot projects in the regions
which have played a pioneering role and inspired this legal amendment (the
example of neighbouring countries, such as France, which introduced regional
nature parks into their legislation a long time ago should not be overlooked
here). The update of the Federal Law on the Conservation of Nature and
Landscape now acknowledges the central role played by these institutions in
the management of landscapes and integrates them into the PAA given that no
policies had provided instruments that enabled this previously. This hypothesis
is fully validated.
6.3.3. H3: Coordination between payers, decision makers, and beneficiaries
Because of their significant organizational flexibility, landscape CPR institutions
can bring together actors who would not otherwise meet, either because of their
different nature (representatives of the state, local authorities, NGOs, civil
society, etc.) or because they are active at different levels (local, regional,
cantonal, national, and even international in the case of UNESCO). In particular,
they assemble the local authorities and different regional tourism actors (who
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are the main payers in this context), the decision-makers at regional level, and
the economic beneficiaries of the local development aspect of this policy.
However, the main beneficiary, the population in general, is not fully represent-
ed: CPR landscape institutions should include a larger number of landscape
users, in particular nationwide nature conservation organizations which represent
the interests of non-local inhabitants who are users of the landscape with partly
different expectations to locals. Non-local tourism companies should also be
included because they ‘‘sell’’ the landscape resources (generating visitor flows)
without contributing to its maintenance. This hypothesis is only partly validated.
7. Discussion and conclusions
Contrary to the hypothesis of the progressive but unavoidable demise of CPR
institutions, the examples presented in this paper would suggest that the
adaptation and even creation of new CPR institutions are possible in the a
priori unfavourable institutional contexts constituted by the current (welfare)
state-oriented political regime. In fact, despite the implementation of a property
rights system which abolished common property regimes and the emergence
since World War II of a very complex legal setting arising from the increasing
number of public policies, CPR institutions continue to play an important role
in the implementation of some (natural resource management) policies, at least
at local and regional levels.
In response to question one, we demonstrated that, in all three cases, the
CPR institutions clearly contribute to the reinforcement of the coherence of the
institutional regime, to the extent that they constitute a kind of ‘‘operator’’ of
the mediation process between the interests, values, and world visions (Weltan-
schaungen) of property and use-rights holders, on the one hand, and the policy
causal and intervention hypotheses, on the other. This contribution made by the
CPR institutions to the process of mediation manifests itself in particular in the
capacity of the CPR institutions to influence the (re) definition of the collective
identity and value system of the property and use-rights holders. Thus, the
different CPR institutions clearly contribute to make hunters, land-owners, and
tourism development actors aware of their responsibilities (even toward the
environment) and to influence their belief systems and behaviours within policy
processes, of which they are the target groups. To be more specific, the CPR
institutions contribute to this mediation by translating the more or less
‘‘technocratic’’ policy action plans and outputs into the logic of the property
and use-rights holders (translation of hunting plans into individual quotas in
the local hunting associations, translation of the obligations to finance and
maintain dykes into the payment of contributions and implementation of specific
tasks by land-owners, and translation of the restrictions associated with land-
scape protection into the restructuring of tourism development projects). Thus,
in this sense, it may be stated that CPR institutions assume a function involving
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the translation or embedding of the policy causal and intervention hypotheses
into the logic of the existing property rights system.
In response to question two, we demonstrated that the integration of CPR
institutions into the PAAs of public policies constitutes a central condition of
their very existence. In effect, we did not locate in our three resource regimes
the existence of enduring CPR institutions which are significantly active in the
management of a resource system outside of the PAA of the relevant public
policy. However, the comparison of the three case studies enables the identifi-
cation of two different modalities of integration of the CPR institutions,
depending on whether they predate (hunting associations, dyke corporations),
accompany, or conversely, result from the implementation of the policy within
the relevant institutional regime (landscape organizations). In effect, the histor-
ical analyses quoted in the case studies would appear to suggest that in the
cases of hunting and dikes, the presence of well organized CPR institutions on
the ground which were actively involved in the management of the resource
clearly influence the choices made by the cantons in the context of the
implementation of policies within the regime. In contrast, the case of the
landscape organizations involves the recent establishment of CPR institutions,
whereby the latter are intended as a form of prefiguration of future regional
nature parks which constitute the key instrument currently being incorporated
into the law on the Conservation of Nature and Landscapes of 1966. Irrespective
of the trajectory of their integration, the essential condition of the survival or
existence of the CPR institutions consists, therefore, in its capacity to reserve
itself a central place in the PAA of the policy in question.
It should be noted here that one of the central conditions for this integration
consists in the fact that the CPR institutions brings together – directly or
through its members – a significant number of property and use rights to the
resource system in question and therefore constitutes an actor that cannot be
ignored within the regime and the only actor capable of guaranteeing the
(reestablishment of the) coherence of the regime through the linking of the
property and use rights of the target groups within the policy objectives and
action logic.
Finally, contrary to the point of view championed by Ostrom (2000),
according to which the perpetuation of CPR institutions primarily depends on
the ‘‘vital’’ dependence of its members with respect to the resource system
regulated by the institution, our case studies show that not only is this condition
not indispensable, but a more important one exists concerning the behaviour of
the state towards them. It may also be considered that Ostrom’s hypothesis
would be more plausible if she did not restrict her conception of dependency
to economically apprehendable material goods, but would extend to symbolic
and immaterial goods and services. For example, in addition to economic
advantages, the work of CPR institutions may provide opportunities at social
and ecological levels. This shift toward symbolic dependency is well illustrated
by the hunting associations in north-east Switzerland. Even if the members are
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no longer dependant on the hunting grounds, they continue to manage them for
symbolic, social, and ecological reasons (e.g. hunting as a social and cultural
event as well as a sporting activity, the management of fauna, etc.). However,
it is important to note that, despite the transformation from material to
immaterial values, some CPR institutions still offer important economic services.
They can tap alternative sources of income (dyke corporations) or function as
a recipient of public subsidies, which the members would not be able to access
as individuals (landscape management organizations).
In response to question three, our case studies empirically confirmed the
majority of advantages and disadvantages of CPR institutions which were
already known for the most part and debated. On the one hand, because of
their low cost to the national community, their relative independence of
institutional boundaries, their legitimacy, and their in-depth knowledge of local
conditions, they are efficient. However, on the other hand, they only deal with
a very limited number of local uses of the resource system (and in many cases
just one) and only benefit from a local view of the situation. Because of the
frequent lack of coordination with other CPR institutions or other institutions
in charge of similar tasks, these characteristics make integrated management at
the level of the resource system very difficult.
We did not focus on the advantages of CPR institutions as such in this
paper, but on their power from the perspective of the resource regime in force
(public policy and property rights system). Thus, hypothesis 3 is well confirmed,
with a reservation in the case of landscape. Despite the fact that these CPR
institutions are integrated into the PAA, the payers, decision-makers, and policy
beneficiaries do not completely overlap. This is only half-surprising. Considering
the complexity of the task involved in the management of this resource
(multiple and competing uses, local and external users), it would appear to be
very difficult to integrate all of the actors involved. The case of the landscape
demonstrates, however, that new CPR institutions, which are well integrated
into policies, are capable of dealing with multiple uses of the resource, unlike
the old CPR institutions which concentrate first and foremost on a single use.
Seen from this perspective, the challenge facing the conception of new
resource management strategies would be to combine the advantages of CPR
institutions with a policy approach that would accommodate nationwide plan-
ning, better coordination between adjacent local spaces, and, hence, the better
synchronization of the different CPR institutions with each other and with other
institutions. Considering the potential of CPR institutions in the area of
sustainable resource management and their difficulties when it comes to the
management of joint uses situations, a practical recommendation would be to
provide recourse to resource management policies which deliberately pave the
way for the creation of new more general CPR institutions, like landscape CPR
institutions, in order to resolve at local levels the lack of coherence between
competing public policies.
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